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as Administrator of the Estate of DAVID G.
SMITH, deceased; JUANITA G. SMITH, surviving wife of DAVID G. SMITH, deceased;
HELEN B. MOTT; L. L. PACK and NORA E.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE Of UTAH
JESSUP THOMAS and IRENE THOMAS, his
wife; WILLIAM H. VAN TASSELL and
DAPHNE VAN TASSELL, his wife; ORVEN
J. MOON and DELPHIA N. MOON, his wife;
and EDWIN CARMAN,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
KARL V. KING, as Administrator of the Estate
of HANNAH J. BAFFET, Deceased; DALLAS
H. YOUNG, Jr., as Administrator with the will
annexed of the Estate of JOHN MAXCY
ZANE, deceased; THE CONTINENTAL BANK
& TRUST COMPANY OF SALT LAKE CITY,
as Administrator of the Estate of DAVID G.
SMITH, deceased; JUANITA G. SMITH, surviving wife of DAVID G. SMITH, deceased;
HELEN B. MOTT; L. L. PACK and NORA E.
PACK, his wife; W. H. COLTHARP and ORAL
COLTHARP, his wife;

Case
No. 8519

Defendants, Intervenors and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

PRELDDNARYSTATEMENT
In order to take away any chance for confusion, the

caption of the action has been amended to cover the actual
1
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appellants and respondents who are now before the court in
this appeal.

All other parties who were previously named

in the caption of the action in the court below and who are
not interested in this appeal have been omitted.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

A.
PARTIES.
The plaintiffs in the court below and appellants herein
are the following: Jessup Thomas and Irene Thomas, his
wife, William H. Van Tassell and Daphne Van Tassell, his
wife, Orven J. Moon and Delphia N. Moon, his wife, and
Edwin Carman. In this brief, these parties shall be designated, for the purpose of brevity and clarity, the plaintiffs.
The defendants in the court below and who are respondents herein, are the following:
1. The Continental Bank and Trust Company of Salt
Lake City, Administrator of the Estate of David G. Smith,
Deceased, Jaunita C. Smith, surviving widow of David G.
Smith, Deceased; Helen B. Mott; L. L. Pack and Nora E.
Pack, his wife; and W. H. Coltharp and Oral Coltharp, his
wife; all of whom claim under the same title, and these
parties will be designated as the Smith defendants for
brevity and clarity.
2. Karl V. King, administrator of the estate of Hannah
J. Braffet, deceased, who claims the same interest as the

2
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above Smith defendants, and is in default in the action, who
will be called the Braffet defendants.
3. Dallas H. Young, Jr., Administrator with the will
annexed of the Estate of John Maxcy Zane, sometimes
known as John M. Zane, Deceased. This interest will be
called the Zane defendants.
B.
PLEADIN-GS.

The pleadings which are pertinent to this appeal are
as follows:
1. Complaint filed June 25th, 1952, alleging a short
form to quiet title against the Smith interests, the heirs of
Mark P. Braffet and Hannah Braffet, both deceased, the
heirs of John M. Zane, deceased, and others. (Rec. 1-5)
2. Answer of David G. Smith and Juanita C. Smith,
his wife; Helen B. Mott; L. L. Pack and Nora E. Pack, his
wife; W. H. Coltharp and Oral Coltharp, his wife. This
answer makes certain general admissions and denials as to
the allegations of the complaint and nothing else. There
are no affirmative allegations. There is no claim that the
defendants or either or any of them own any interest in
the lands involved in the action, or that they are entitled to
the possession of the same. There is no , counterclaim.
There is a prayer that "these defendants' title and ownership in an undivided one-third ( 1/3) interest in the real
property described in the complaint be quieted in ~hese
defendants" but there is no allegation of any _nature to

3
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support such a prayer. This answer was filed March 21st,
1953. Said answer was signed by Dallas H. Young, Young,
Young & Sorensen, Attorneys for said defendants. (Record
14-16)
3. Order Authorizing Joinder of Additional Parties,
filed March 21st, 1953, joining The Carter Oil Company,
Edwin Carman, Irene Thomas, Daphne Van Tassell and
DelphiaN. Moon as parties. (Record 22-23)
4. Reply of the Carter Oil Company, to the answer
of the Smith interests setting up the bar of the Statute of
Limitations as contained in Section 78-12-6, U.C.A. 1953,
and the provisions of Chapter 19, Laws of Utah, 1951, and
claiming an Oil and Gas Lease under Jessup Thomas and
Irene Thomas, his wife, plaintiffs, herein. This was filed
May 7th, 1953. Said Answer denies any title in the defendants and sets forth many matters not in issue here.
(Record 32-36)
5.

Order dismissing the action as to all defendants

excepting David G. Smith and Juanita C. Smith, his wife;
Helen B. Mott; L. L. Pack and Nora E. Pack, his wife;
and W. H. Coltharp and Oral Coltharp, his wife. Filed
September 14, 1953. The dismissal is without prejudice.
(Record 52) .
6. ORDER SUBSTITUTING A REPRESENTATIVE
FOR DAVID G. SMITH, DECEASED, filed March 26th,
1954. The Continental Bank and Trust Company of Salt
Lake City was substituted for the defendant, David G.
Smith. (Record 74).
4
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7. ANSWER OF INTERVENOR, filed April 27, 1954,
wherein Karl. V. King, Administrator of the Estate of
Hannah J. Braffet, .D.eceased, _in_ his first defense, makes
general admissions and denials of the rna tters alleged -in
the complaint. Said answer. further alleges that ~'at the
time of the death of said Hannah J. Braffet, she had an
undivided interest in the real estate described in the complaint and that upon her death her interest descended
to her heirs subject to being probated." Said answer prays
that the "undivided interest in the real property described
in the complaint, as her interest may appear, be quieted in
the intervenor." Said answer is signed by Dallas H. Young,
attorney for Administrator of the Estate ·of Hannah J.
Braffet, deceased.
As a second defense the answer alleges the civil action
No. 2263 in the same court, setting forth the names of the
plaintiffs and defendants. Jessup Thomas is not listed as
a plaintiff, and Hannah J. Braffet, her legal representative,
or anyone connected with her is not listed as a defendant.
Neither are The Carter Oil Company, Edwin Carman, Irene
Thomas, Daphne Van Tassell and Delphia N. Moon listed
as parties, these parties having been made parties on March
21st, 1953, before the filing of the answer. The following
named persons were made parties to this present action
who were not made parties to the said civil action No. 2263,
namely: Jane Doe Miller, the wife of C. E. Miller; Jane Doe
Stenger, the wife of Ernest Stenger; Minnie Barboglio, the
wife of Peter Barboglio; R. J. Turner and Gertrude Ella
Turner, his wife; J. R. Sharp; and Duchesne ·county.

5
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Further continuing as a second defense, said answer
sets up the present action and alleges the names of the
plaintiffs and the defendants therein, omitting, however,
the names of The Carter Oil Company, Edwin Carman,
Irene Thomas, Daphne Van Tassell and Delphia N. Moon,
who had been made parties previously to the filing of the
answer, and prior to the dismissal alleged. The answer
further sets up that the actions were voluntarily dismissed
by the plaintiffs, and that the two dismissals operated "as
an adjudication upon the merits and under Rule 41 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah Code Annotated 1953."
No mention is made in this answer of Civil Action No.
2693.

(Record 77-81)

No counterclaim was filed by this defendant.
8. AMENDED ANSWER OF INTERVENOR, filed
April 27th, 1954, wherein Dallas H. Young Jr., Administrator with the will annexed of the estate of John Maxcy Zane,
deceased, in his first defense, makes general admissions and
denials of the matters alleged in the complaint. Said
answer further alleges "that at the time of the death of
the said John M. Zane, he had an undivided 1/6 interest
in the real estate described in the complaint and that upon
his death his interest descended to his heirs subject to
being probated."
The same defenses are set up in the second cause of
action as are set up in No. 7 last above. Other than the
fact that John M. Zane was made a party defendant in
6
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Civil Action No. 2263, the same differences in parties exist.
The same issue is set forth as is raised in paragraph 7
above. The answer is signed by Dallas H. Young as attorney for said administrator. No counterclaim was filed by
this defendant. (Record 82-86)
9. REPLY BY PLAINTIFFS AND BY DEFENDANT,
THE

CARTER OIL

COMPANY,

TO

ANSWER

OF

DALLAS H. YOUNG, JR., ADMINISTRATOR, filed April
27th, 1954, making general admissions and denials, and
setting up the Statute of Limitations,

particul~rly 78-12~6,

U. C. A. 1953, and Chapter 19, Laws of Utah, 1951.
(Record 87)
10. Decree Quieting Title, filed September 13th, 1954,
wherein an undivided 1j3 interest in the lands described in
the complaint was quieted in the Smith defendants, 1/6
in the Zane defendants, and 2/9 in the Braffet defendants.
The Smith and the Braffet interests are the same, and the
1j3 in litigation was quieted to cover 5/9 undivided interest.
The Smith and Braffet defendants are adverse to each
other.

(Record 104-106)

11.
ORDER OPENING AND WITHDRAWING
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
DECREE, AND ORDER GRANTING A NEW TRIAL,
filed December 13th, 1954. This was granted mainly on
the double interest quieted in the original decree. (Record
113.)
12.

WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL.

Dallas H.

7
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Young withdraws as counsel for Karl V. King, Administrator
of the Estate of Hannah J. Braffet, Deceased. (Record 114)
13. NOTICE TO APPEAR BY COUNSEL OR PERSONALLY, filed February 17th, 1955, wherein Karl V.
King, Administrator, is given notice to appear. (Record
116). The default of Karl V. King, Administrator as aforesaid, was entered March 16th, 1955. (Record 124.)
14. REPLY OF PLAINTIFFS AND ADDED PARTIES TO ANSWER, filed April 25th, 1955. This reply makes
general denials and admissions, and sets up limitations set
forth in Section 78-12-6, U.C.A. 1953, and the provisions of
Chapter 19, Laws of Utah, 1951. This affects the Smith
interests.
15. REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF INTERVENOR. Plaintiffs and added parties make general denials and admissions, and set up limitations of Section
78-12-6, U.C.A. 1953, and the provisions of Chapter 19,
Laws of Utah, 1951. This affects the Zane interests.
16. STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL OF ACTION
AS TO DEFENDANT THE CARTER OIL COMPANY,
filed November 28th, 1955.
The issues tried and which are pertinent to this appeal
under the pleadings were the following:
a. Plaintiffs claim under a tax title.
b. Plaintiffs and added parties claimed that the various defendants, Smith, Braffet and Zane defendants, were
8
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barred from interposing their various answers by the provisions of Section 78-12-6, U. C. A. 1953, and the provisions
of Chapter 19, Laws of Utah, 1951.
c. The Smith defendants claimed that while the statute
might be effective at the time of the commencement of this
action, the statute was tolled by the filing by the plaintiffs
of civil action No. 2693, and by the filing of the answer by
the said defendants in civil action No. 2693.
d. The Smith and Zane defendants claimed that the
tax proceedings were invalid because there was no auditor's
affidavit affixed to the assessment rolls for the year 1929.
(Transcript 9).
e. The Zane defendants claimed that the dismissals by
order of the court in Civil Actions 2263, 2693 and in the
present action constituted dismissals on the merits under
Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
No claim was made by the defendants or any of them
that the deed to the County, and the deed from the county
to Jessup Thomas were not valid of their face or that the
deeds were not made by the proper governmental authority.
There was some evidence introduced to show possession by the plaintiffs, (Record 133-4), but the issue was
disposed of by the court and the case decided on the issue
of the Auditor's Tax Deed given May 19th, 1936, and as to
plaintiffs further claim, that defendants are barred by the
statute of limitations. (Record 133-4)
9
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c.
EVIDENCE.
Except as to the testimony regarding possession, which
is not in issue on this appeal, all of the testimony offered
by both plaintiffs and defendants was documentary.

The

plaintiffs introduced the following evidence.
EXHIBIT A:

A certified photographic copy of the

Tax Sale Record showing the tax sale of the property involved in this action on Line 5 of Page 56, Sale No. 665,
which certification was made by Dorothea W. Allred,
County Recorder of Duchesne County, State of Utah, under
date of March 15th, 1954. No objection was made to this
exhibit by defendants (Transcript 7).
EXHIBIT B:

Certified photographic copy of the re-

cord in the office of the County Recorder of Duchesne
County, Utah, of the Auditor's Tax Deed of the property
involved in this action, made to Duchesne County, Utah.
No objection was made to this exhibit by defendants (Transcript 7).
EXHIBIT C:

Abstract of title No. 3002, prepared by

Stanley Title Company, final certificate dated January 20th,
1953, at 9:00 o'clock A. M., showing the title up to the date
of certification of the lands involved in this action.

No

objection was made by defendants to this exhibit (Transcript 7).
EXHIBIT D:

Statement of the assessment and pay-

ment of taxes on the property involved in the action from
10
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1937 to 1954, inclusive, certified to by ·Leland Wright,
Treasurer, Duchesne .County, Utah under date of April
25th, 1955. Objection was made by defendants to this exhibit but the objection was withdrawn. (Transcript 7.)
EXHIBIT E: Photographic copy of minutes of the
Fourth Judicial District ·Court, Duchesne County, State of
Utah, for June 23, 1952, showing that Dallas H. Young
made no objection to the dismissal of civil action No. 2693,
on behalf of the defendants he represented.
The defendants introduced the following evidence:
Civil file No. 2263, in the Fourth Judicial District Court
of the State of Utah, County of Duchesne, wherein William
H. Van Tassell, et al., were plaintiffs, and Mark P. Braffet,
et. al., were defendants, was offered in evidence by defendants, and over the objection of the plaintiffs, the file
was rceived in evidence (Transcript 10.)
Civil file No. 2693 was offered in evidence by the defendants to which to the plaintiffs objected as follows: "We
object to the introduction of the exhibit on the grounds that
it is not within the issues of the case. There is no pleading
to warrant the introduction of this file in evidence and we
object further on the grounds that this is an attempt to
set aside a valid order of this Court, the order being one
dismissing the action without prejudice which was duly
signed by Judge Tuckett and therefore the introduction
of this is not within the issues of the case." (Transcript 1011).
11
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The only other evidence introduced by defendants \~vas
by stipulation that there was no auditor's affidavit attached
to the assessment rolls for the year 1929. No other evidence attacking the Auditor's Tax Deed or the validity
thereof was presented, and no other irregularities claimed.
(Transcript 9.)
It is interesting to note that all of the plaintiffs were
present in court but that none of the defendants were
present. (Record 172 and 184) .
It is to be noted further that no evidence was introduced by the defendants or either or any of them that they
had ever been in possession of the lands described in the
complaint.
The plaintiffs claim error in the admission of Civil files
Nos. 2263 and 2693 into evidence over the objections stated
at pages 9, 10 and 11 of the transcript.
There is no evidence in the case to alter or amend any
instrument in writing and nothing to vary the instruments
as they appear on file.
STATEMENT OF POINTS.
POINT I.
Conclusion of Law No. 1 is contrary to and not supported by the findings of fact, the documentary evidence on
file, and the law, the defendants named therein being
barred from asserting any claim to the ~ands involved in
the action by the provisions of Chapter 19, Laws of Utah,
1951.

12
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POINT II.

Conclusion of Law No. 2 is contrary to and not sup~
ported by the findings of fact, the documentary evidence
on file, and the law, the defendants in said conclusion failing to raise any issue of the tolling of the statute by appropriate pleadings, and the evidence showing that the statute
was not tolled by former actions.
POINT III.

Conclusions of Law Nos. 3, 5 and 7 are contrary to
and not supported by the findings of fact and documentary
evidence on file, and the law, the defendants named therein
failing to make any pleadings upon which such conclusions
can be made.
POINT IV.

Conclusion of Law No. 4 is contrary to and not supported by the· findings of fact, the documentary evidence
on file, and the law, and the record shows that the defendants named therein did not at any time have the interest
awarded to them in said conclusion.
POINT V.

Conclusion of Law No. 6 is contrary to and not supported by the findings of fact, the documentary evidence
on file, and the law.
POINT VI.

The Amended Decree is contrary to and not supported

13
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by the findings of fact, the documentary evidence on file,
and the law.
POINT VIT.
From the findings of fact, the documentary evidence
on file, and the law, the plaintiffs and appellants are entitled
to a decree quieting their title as against all of the answerin defendants and all of the respondents.
ARGUMENT.
As a preliminary statement to the argument, the findings of fact shown in the record are accepted in their entirety by the plaintiffs as correct findings except that the
plaintiffs object to the admissibility of the civil files Nos.
2263 and 2693 from which findings of fact Nos. IX and X,
shown at pages 178 and 179 of the record, were made. The
appeal is made on the basis that the conclusions of law
made upon the findings of fact are not in accordance with
the facts and the law, and that the Amended Decree shown
at pages 183 to 185 of the record, upon the facts and the
law, should be reversed and the title to the property involved quieted in the plaintiffs as against the var~ous defendants.
POINT I.
CONCLUSION OF LAW NO 1 IS CONTRARY TO
AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF F ACf,
THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ON FILE, AND THE
LAW, THE DEFENDANTS NAMED THEREIN BEING
BARRED FROM ASSERTING ANY CLAIM TO THE
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LANDS INVOLVED IN· THE ACTION BY THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER 19, ·LAWS OF UTAH, 1951.
The lower Court in his decision (Record 138) . finds
that Chapter 19, Laws of Utah, 1951, is a validly enacted
statute and states the law applicable in this case. The decision then goes to the effect that as to the Smith interests,
the filing of the prior actions. tolled the statute as to the
S~ith interests. The court further decided that the pribr
dismissals of former acions was an adjudication on the
merits under rule 41A. As to the tolling of the statute and
..
the effect of the rule 41A, these mattE~rs will be discussed
later.
.

.

It therefore goes without saying that the limitations
are effective unless so tolled or made inoperative by prior
actions.
Subject to the above exceptions or matters in avoidance, the present case is exactly in point with the case .of
Hansen v. Morris, 283 P.2d 884, 3 Utah 2d 310. "No claim
is made that the deed was not valid on its face or that it
was not issued by the proper governmental authority." In
the light of the decision in this quoted case, Findings of
Fact Nos. VI, VII and VIII are immaterial. (Record 177.)
There is no finding of fact that the plaintiffs or either or
any of them had ever beeri in possession of the lands involvr

ed in the action.
This action was commenced by the filing of the com-
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plaint on June 25th, 1952. Chapter 19, Laws of Utah, 1951,
took effect on May 8th, 1951, with a provision that it would
not become effective for one year. It became fully effective
on May 8th, 1952 as to all parties.
Finding of Fact V(6) finds the Auditor's Tax Deed
upon which plaintiffs rely was dated April lOth, 1936, recorded May 19th, 1936, in Book "5" of Auditor's Tax Deeds,
page 506, as Entry No. 57393 of the records of Duchesne
County, Utah. (Record 176) There is no finding that the
deed is void on its face, or otherwise. Subject to the matters above mentioned, the record and the findings of fact
show that the plaintiffs have established their claim to title.
POINT II.
CONCLUSION OF LAW NO. 2 IS CONTRARY TO
AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT,
THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ON FILE, AND THE
LAW, THE DEFENDANTS IN SAID CONCLUSION FAILING TO RAISE ANY ISSUE OF THE TOLLING OF THE
STATUTE BY APPROPRIATE PLEADINGS, AND THE
EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT THE STATUTE WAS NOT
TOLLED BY FORMER ACTIONS.
This point goes to the Smith interests only.
We have the same situation here as existed in the case
of Hansen v. Morris, supra. There is no limitation running
against the plaintiffs. The limitation is running against
the defendants. In the last mentioned case, this Supreme
Court holds that it is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead
16
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jn

the statute of limitations running
favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant. It is· necessary for the. defendant
agai:nst ~h<?,~·~th~ sta~tlt~.i~ ru~ning to ple~d.special matters
·in avoidance· of·~~~· :statute of limitations which has run
against him. ·....·:· ·
••

•

' . ; .•

• •

•

•

J

"' •

• '

•

•

"'·

•

•

~·

•

•
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Rule 8 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civili:Procedure, proyiqe,s .as follows:
."(c) AfFI~MATIVE DEFENSES. In pleading to .a preceding.~ pleading~ a party shall set forth
. affirmatively accord; arid satisfactio;n, arbitration
· and award,. assumpt~on of risk, e~:n1trlhutory negligence, discharge. in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel,
: J~ilure of consideratiol}., fraud, ~llegality, injury
' by fellow .servant, .lac4es, license·, pa,.yment, re"lease, res ju~icata, ::~tattJte· of. frauds,' statute of
limitations, waiver,. and other mc;ltter constituting
an avoidance or. affirmative defense."· (Emphasis
added.)
.,;·:'J

·.·...

Th~

answer of the· Smith defendants ·.··(Record

14~16)

alleges nothing with respect to' the speciaJ matters in avoidance of the statute of limitittions set forth 'in Conclusion of
Law No.2, namely the tolling of the statute by the filing of
Civil A;ctlon Nos. 2693 and 2764. (Record 14-16). Plaintiffs
think this is fatal. No issue was raised··. Without proper
pleadings. Objection was made. bY. plainti~fs to. the introductiqn of the file in Civil .N_o. 2693 on the ~ery ground
that there wer~ ~o .pleadings upon. which s~ch file could be
introduced. (Transcript 10-11).
In the case of Johanson v. Cudahy· Packing Co., 152
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P.2d 98, 107 Utah 114, in a case involving the tolling of the
statute of limitations, said:
"The appellants contend that in view of the former action brought by plaintiffs the running of
the statute of limitations was tolled by Section
104-2-41, which section permits the plaintiff to
commence a new action within one year after
the former action (which involved the former
appeal referred to above) failed otherwise than
on its merits. But there is nothing on the face
of this complaint to show that Section 104-2-41
has been brought into play. From all that appears from the complaint this is the first time
that any action has been commenced to recover
for the wrongful death of Robert Johanson. We
cannot judcially notice proceedings and records
of a case previously determined. Robinson v.
Kelly, 69 Utah 376, 255 P. 430; Spencer v. Industrial Commission, 81 Utah 511, 20 P.2d 618."
While the position of the plaintiffs and defendants in
this action is reversed, the same rule applies to the answer
made by the defendants. We have a dearth of decisions
regarding litigation wherein the plaintiff raises the statute
of limitations. The general rule which was upheld in Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., supra, is best stated under
Limitation of Actions in 54 C.J.S., page 594:
e. Prior Action.
As a general rule the party who relies on the dismissal or other termination of a prior action to
bring a subsequent action within an exception
extending the time for suing where a prior action
was terminated under certain circumstances must,
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by his allegations, show all that is essential to
bring the case within the exception.
See also 115 A. L. R., page 765, under III. Necessity of
alleging matter in avoidance under the subdivision A, General Rule, which cites Clawson v. Boston Acme Mines Development Co., 269 P. 147 at page 152, 72 Utah, 137.

The

latter goes into some detail about the necessity of pleading
specially to avoid limitations.
Departing from the necessity of pleading the avoidance
of the statute, we now turn to the proposition of whether or
not the filing of the complaint in Civil Action No. 2693 and
the answer filed therein by the Smith defendants (Record
14-16) tolled the statute of limitations in favor of the Smith
defendants so that the Statute of Limitations in said Chaper 19 does not apply herein.
34 Am. Jur. 227, states as follows:
"No. 281. DISMISSAL, DISCONTINUANCE,
AND NONSUIT.-In the absence of statute, a
party cannot deduct from the period of the statute of limitations applicable to his case the time
consumed by the pendency of an action in which
he sought to have the matter adjudicated, but
which was dismissed without prejudice as to him,
and if, before he commences a new action after
having become nonsuited or having had his action
abated or dismissed, the limitation runs, the right
to a new action is barred. * * * * * In a number
of jurisdictions, however, the statutes, in language
that is by no means uniform, authorize the commencement of a new action within a prescribed
19
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period after a nonsuit or dismissal of a prior action. Some of such statutes apply to both voluntary and involuntary dismissals."
The above rule has universal application. In Utah, our
Code has a chapter dealing with matters which toll the
statute of limitations. This is article 3, of Chapter 12 of
the Judicial Code, comprising sections 78-12-35 to 78-12-46,
pages 152 to 164, of Volume 9, U.C.A. 1953. From the
answer of the Smith defendants (Record 14-16) plaintiffs
are at a loss to know which section is claimed to provide the
tolling of the statute by the filing of civil action No. 2693,
and the basis upon which Conclusion of Law No. 2 (Record
11) concludes that such filing "tolled the statute of limitations from July 27, 1951, until it was dismissed on June
23, 1952." (Record 181). The only section upon which
anyone could rely for tolling the statute would be Section
78-12-40, U.C.A. 1953, which reads:
"78-12-40. EFFECT OF F AlLURE OF ACTION
NOT ON MERITS.-If any action is commenced
within due time and a judgment thereon for the
plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in
such action or upon a cause of action otherwise
than upon the merits, and the time limited either
by law or contract for commencing the same
shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies and
the cause of action survives, his representatives,
may commence a new action within one year
after the reversal or failure."
This quoted section provides for the only way in which
a new action may be brought after the statute of limitations
20
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has run.· This section is for the· benefit of-~a PLAINTIFF
and says nothing about a DEFENDANT. · In the present
action, there is no statute running AGAINST the plaintiff
which plaintiffs. are .setting up as being tolled by any prior
action.. The statute of limitations relied on by plaintiffs is
running in their favor and against the defendants.
· The defendants cannot claim the benefit of Section
78-12-40. They are not plaintiffs and they .did not institute

the actions, either No. 2693 or the present action.
It may be argued that the defendants, as counterclaimants, might claim the benefit of Section 78-12-40, _ providing that they can show that they filed ,a counter-clajm
within time. This they ce1:nnot do.
•

t

I

:,

.f

In Civil Action 2693 admitted into evidence ·ove·r the
plaintiffs' objection, the plain.tiffs filed a complaint)n the
usual short form to quiet title. On Au~st 2()th,_ 19!?1,
tQe Smith defendants filed an Answe.r. In this answer, the
defendants made no claim of ownership of the lands involved
in the action. The only claim of interest is stated as follows:
~

.

I

'

-

~

\_ •

"1. Admit that they claim- a right title and interest in and to the property described in plaintiffs
complaint which is adverse to the alleged claim
of interest of the plaintiffs."
The nature of this claim is not set forth as demanded
in the plaintiffs' complaint.
The right, title and interest
which defendants claimed might have been' as a lien-holder,
mortgagee, or any number of interests which would not be
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possessory. This answer could in no-wise be denominated
a counter-claim. Rule 8 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, provides as follows:
"(a) CLAIMS FOR RELIEF. A pleading which
sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgement
for the relief to which he deems himself entitled."
The prayer in said answer prays "that defendants title
be quieted in the property above described." There is
nothing alleged in the answer which upon this relief can be
granted. The defendants do not allege that they own any
interest in the property described. Hence, this answer can
not be treated as a counterclaim.
On June 16th, 1952, the Smith defendants filed an
"Amended Answer" in said Civil Action No. 2693. In this
new amended answer, they set up a new counterclaim,
alleging that "they are the owners in fee simple of a onethird interest in all of the surface rights in the property
described in the complaint, and of a five-eighteenths interest
in all oil, gas and minerals under said premises." They
also prayed that their title be quieted to these interests.
On the face of the pleading it appears that a good cause
of action was stated and the relief prayed for thereunder.
However, there are factors which negative the effectiveness of this "Amended Answer."
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·At the time of the filing of this. "Amended Answer"
on. June. 16th, :·1952, the prov:isions of Chapter 19, Laws ot
Utah,' .1951, W:er~, ·in Jull force and .effect. . .The limitation
statute became effective on May 8th, 1951. More than one
y~a.r had elapsed before the filing of
this
"Amended
.·..
·-;
....
..
...
..
1\llsw~r~'~ . . There was no. counterclaim or affirmative allegatiorrs made· 'in · the original answer. The affirmative
·.:;,

.,

.·. ,_

:···_:

· ,

.'

.,

·.

a11~.~ations cons~ituted a new cause .?f actions which was
not set up in the(.original answer, wnerein the defendants
set up ownership irt the ·property and prayed ·for a decree
quieting their tftles. Under these· circurristarices, the statute
of limitations continued to run against this new cause of
a~tion stated by the ·defendants. See 127· A.L.R., 918.

At' ·best, the Smith .defendants· cannot maintain the
statement in Conclusion of Law No . 2. (Record.,l81) which
reads:
"The filing by plaintiffs on June. 27, 1951 of Civil
Action 2693·.and the filing of the answer by the
defendants * * · * * * tolled the statute of limitations from· July 27th, 1951, until it was dismissed
on June 23, 1952."
The case of Weiner vs. Stearns, et. al., 120 Pac. 490,
40 Utah, l85, is directly. in point in .this regard. . The plaintiff, .a tax title.. ho~?er, brought suit to quiet title.
The
defendant raised the statute of limitations. Two actions
were involved, one of wihch was dismissed. · Qne of the
questions iiivolv~ was whether or not the time consumed
by the p.endency in. the dismissed action could .be deducted
·23
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from the full statutory time which had run until the commencement of the second action. Regarding this question,
the court said, commencing on page 495 of the Pacific
Reporter:
''Nor does the statute cease to run, except
for the purpose of the particular action, and,
unless there is a special statute saving the right
to bring a new action in case a pending action
fails, or is dismissed otherwise than upon merits,
no new action can be maintained if the statutory
period of limitations had fully run, pending the
action which had so failed or been dismissed.

:)(: * * * *
"The rule is clearly stated by the author of
Wood on Limitation of Actions (section 272) in
the following words: 'Although the adverse possession of a defendants in ejectment cannot, during the pendency of the suit, ripen into an
absolute title under the operation of the statute
of limitations, yet the effect of the statute is
neutralized only in respect to the particular suit
and the plaintiff therein. And, after the termination of that suit, the statutory limitation having
meanwhile expired, no subsequent action can be
brought, either at law or in equity, to question
that title or possession; and if the plaintiff fails
therein the period during which the action was
pending is not deducted from the period requisite
to gain a title by possession.'
"This principle is frequently applied in our
own courts. Suppose a cause of action accrues
on a promissory note on one day, and an action
is commenced to enforce payment thereof on the
next day. Suppose, further, that the action remains pending and undisposed of for the full
24
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period of the statute of limitations, and then fails
·or is dismissed otherwise than on merits. Would
anyone contend that, in case another action was
commenced on the same note, the defendant
could not successfully a vail himself of the statute
of limitations, in case the latter action was not
commenced within a year from the time the first
action failed, or was dismissed, as provided in
Comp. Laws 1907, No. 2893 (now 78-12-40, U.C.A.
1953)? And would anyone further contend that
if it were not for that section the plaintiff, under
the foregoing circumstances, could successfully
maintain .a new action, in case the defendant
plead the statute of limitations? It is manifest,
therefore, that the commencement of an action,
· although commenced against the adverse party,
doest not arrest the running of statute, even as
against such a party, except for the purpose of
the particular ·proceeding that is pending."
The holding in conclusion of law No. 2 is therefore in
error.
By way of emphasis, Section 78-12-40 is for the benefit
of PLAINTIFFS. It cannot be relied upon by DEFENDANTS. In the instant case, this is especially so. The
Answer of the Smith defendants (Record 14-16) is a mere
answer of admissions and denials, and does not set forth
any counter-claim or affirmative allegations of any nature.
It cannot be said to set forth an independent cause of action
in any respect, although there is a plea that the title of the
defendants be quieted. They have brought no "new action"
which saves their "cause of action" which might have been
stated in Civil Action No. 2693.
25
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This very point is ruled on the case of Weiner v.
Stearns, supra, as set forth on page 497 of the Pacific
Reporter:
"Where, however, as in the case here, the action
is commenced by the party who subsequently
pleads the bar, we cannot see how the statute of
limitations can be arrested, as against him, by
the bringing of an action.''

*****
"While it is true that Borg had disputed
appellants's title to the property in his action
commenced in January, 1907, yet that action was
dismissed; and hence, under the rule to which
we have hereinbefore referred, the statute continued to run against him until he made his subsequent application in the following February."
It is interesting to note in reviewing the facts of the
case above quoted that the defendant commenced his counter action on January 29th, 1907, that said action was
dismissed and on February 25, 1907, said defendant filed
an application in the original action. The above quotation
holds that the commencing of the action on January 29th,
1907, did not toll the statute of limitations, and that the
statute ran until February 25th, 1907. The benefits of
Section 2893, Compiled Laws, 1907, now Section 78-12-40
U.C.A. 1953, were not allowed to the defendant.
cannot be allowed to the defendants in this action.

They

The present action was commenced on June 25th,
1952 (Record 2764). The dismissal of civil action No.
2693 took place on June 23rd, 1952 (see file)) pursuant to
26
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the allegations in the Amended Answer of the Smith
defendants (see file) , on motion of the plaintiffs, and
without objection by Dallas H. Young, Attorney for all
defendants, who was present at the hearing when the
motion for dismissal was made (Plaintiffs' Exhibit E).
In summary on Point II, the plaintiffs set forth:
(1) There are no pleadings in the complaint (Record
1-5) nor in the Answer of the Smith defendants (Record
14-16) to show that any other action had been commenced
on the same claim presented in this action, and the court
cannot take judicial notice of the previous action No. 2693.
Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 152 P.2d 98, 107 Utah
114, supra.
(2) It was error to allow the introduction of the file
in Civil Action No. 2693 over the plaintiffs' objection
(Transcript 10-11).
(3) The statute of limitations set up in Chapter 19,
Laws of Utah, 1951, was not tolled by the pendency of Civil
Action No. 2693 only for that particular action, and upon
the dismissal of that action, the statute had fully run against
the defendants.
(4) That at the time of the commencement of the
present action, on June 25th, 1952, the provisions of Chapter 19, Laws of Utah, 1951, were fully effective as against
the defendants, and they are barred from asserting any
answer, counterclaim or other claim for relief in this Civil
Action No. 2764.
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POINT III.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NOS. 3, 5 and 7 ARE
CONTRARY TO AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ON
FILE, AND THE LAW, THE DEFENDANTS NAMED
THEREIN FAILING TO MAKE ANY PLEADINGS UPON
WHICH SUCH CONCLUSIONS CAN BE MADE.
Conclusions of Law 3, 5 and 7 involve the Zane defendants. They are based upon the Amended Answer of the
Intervenor (Record 82-86) and Findings of Fact IX, X and
XI. (Record 178-180).
The Amended Answer of Intervenor (Record 82-86)
states in paragrah 6:
"6. That the dismissal of these actions by the
plaintiffs operated as an adjucations upon the
merits and under Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, Utah Code Annotated 1953, this defendant is entitled to a judgement of this Court
quieting the title of the John M. Zane estate to
an undivided one-sixth interest in the property
above described."
The Zane defendants do not claim that the statute of
limitations was tolled as to them. Their sole claim is that
the dismissals in the two former actions constituted an
adjuication on the merits. The two former actions alleged
are No. 2263, filed June 1st, 1946, and No. 2764 (the
instant action), filed June 25th, 1952. Conclusion of Law
3 (Record 181) finds that "Plaintiffs' dismissal of Civil
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actions 2693 and 2764 as to the heirs of John M. Zane,
deceased, operated as an adjuca tion of the claim stated in
those actions upon the merits."
There are two errors on the face of said conclusion of
law No. 3. The Finding of Fact No. X (Record 179) finds
with respect to Civil Action No. 2693:
"On June 23, 1952, Judge R. L. Tuckett of
this court, at the instance and request of plaintiffs, entered an order dismissing said action
without prejudice for the reasons set forth in the
Amended Answer of defendants and without objection by the attorneys for said defendants."
The Finding of Fact No. XI (c) finds with respect to
civil action No. 2764:
" (c) Judge R. L. Tuckett of this court, at
the instance and request of plaintiffs, entered an
order dismissing this action as to all defendants
excepting those who had answered in paragraph
(b) last above, said order being filed September
14, 1953, and said order being without prejudice."
The first error is that the conclusion that PLAINTIFFS
dismissed the actions.

They were both dismissed by order

of court.
The second error is that the pleadings of the Zane
defendants goes to the effect that the present action cannot
be prosecuted by the plaintiffs because of the two dismissals
in Civil Actions No. 2263 and 2764, and the conclusion of
law is to the effect that said two disn1issals took place in
Civil Actions No. 2693 and 2764.
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In both the amended answer and in Conclusion of Law
No. 3, Civil Action No. 2764 is the basis of the relief prayed
for and obtained in this action which is now before this
Supreme Court on appeal. The Zane defendants plead that
the second dismissal in Civil Action No. 2764 amounted
to a dismissal on the merits, and then the lower court gives
them judegement in Civil Action No. 2764, on the ground
that the action has been dismissed. It is true that Judge
R. L. Tuckett dismissed Civil Action No. 2764 as to the
Zane defendants on September 14th, 1953 (Record 52).
It· is just as true that the Zane defendants filed
an

answer

in

intervention

(Record 67-69)

and

an amended answer (Record 82-86.) This intervention on
the part of the Zane defendants reinstated the action as to
them, or in the alternative, the dismissal is still effective.
They canriot have their cake and eat it too. Either there
was no .second dismissal which was effective as to them, or
they have no standing in this case. These defendants cannot
voluntarily reinstate this action as to them, and then claim
relief in the action on the ground that the action has been
dismissed as to them.
There are three actions which are involved in this
phase ·of the case, and in each there is an order dismissing
the action. They are as follows:
No. 2263, filed May 22nd, 1946. The first Order of
dismissal was signed by R. L. Tuckett on October lOth,
1949, and filed November 3rd, 1949, dismissing the action
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as to the Zane defendants.

There was another Order of

dismissal signed by JudgeR. L.. Tuckett completely dismissing the action on June 23rd, 1952. (Finding 9, Record 178)
"

No. 2693, filed July 27th, 1951.

Judge R. L. Tuckett

signed the Order of Dismissal on June 23rd, 1952, and it
was filed the same day. (Finding 10, Record 178-9)
No. 2764, the present action, was filed June 25th, 1952.
There is an Order signed by JudgeR. L. Tuckett, dismissing
this action as to all defendants except the Smith defendants,
dated September 14th, 1953, filed September 14th, 1953.
(Finding 11, Record 179).
Each of the dismissals signed by Judge R. L. Tuckett
is made without prejudice excepting the first one in Civil
Action No. 2263. Nothing is said in No. 2263 in the Order
dismissing the action as to the parties named therein as to
whether it was made with or without prejudice.
Further, there is not one Notice of Dismissal made
without order of the court by the plaintiffs or either or any
of them in any of the actions.
In order to appreciate the stand taken by the Zane de-

fendants and upheld by the Lower Court, it is necessary to
quote from one of the briefs of the defendant, filed in
the Lower Court:
"It is to be noted that there is no provision in the
rules which allows the court to make an order
of dismissal against a defendant who has not
either answered or filed a motion for a summary
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judgment. The only procedure for dismissing
against such a defendant is contained in Rule
41 (a) l."
"The recitals in the orders of dismissal that the
dismissals are without prejudice cannot be of
significance. If it were otherwise, then the parties
and the court may defeat the operation of the
rules by placing something in the order of the
court contrary to the provisions of the rules. As
we have pointed out, the dismissals, if they are
effective against the Zane and Braffet interests,
must have been made pursuant to Rule 41 (a) 1."
In the event that the judge does actually dismiss an
action by order without prejudice prior to the filing of an
answer or motion for summary judgment, what is its lega1
·effect? Is it void because the court has no jurisdiction or
because the court exceeds his jurisdiction? If such is the
case, then the actions are still pending. No notices of dismissal have been filed or entered by the plaintiffs without
order of the court. Plaintiffs have found no cases in point,
and challenged the defendants to present such cases, which
they have not done.
Rule 41 (a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure reads as
follows:
"(a) VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL: EFFECT
THEREOF.
By Plaintiff; By Stipulation. Subject
to the provisions of Rule 23 (c) , of Rule 66, and
of any applicable statute, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i)
by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before
" ( 1)
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service by the adverse party of an answer or of a
motion for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing
a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who
have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise
stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation,
the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a
notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has
once dismissed in any court of the United States
or of any state an action based on or including
the same claim.''
'' (2) By Order of Court. Except as provided
in paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule,
an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's
instance save upon order of the court and upon
such terms and conditions as the court deems
proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by
a defendant prior to the service upon him of the
plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action shall not
be dismissed against the defendant's objection
unless the counterclaim can remain pending for
independent adjuication by the court. Unless
otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under
this paragraph is without prejudice."
Following the line of reasoning of the defendants,
the various orders dismissing the three actions without
prejudice, all signed by Judge R. L. Tuckett, and all being
specifically without prejudice, are nullities. The fact that
plaintiffs moved for these orders made them invalid, according to defendants. The plaintiffs have never gone along
with this reasoning although the lower court did.
Each of the orders were made in open court and were
regularly filed therein. They were not appealed from.
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No motion has been made to set any of them aside, except
~qr t~~ . y~1Uf1ta~y: interpleadings_ made by· the Zane and
Braffett defendants which interpleadings nullified the order
of dismissal .in this action 2764 now before this Supreme
¢ou.rt_,.jns~far as it pertains to the Zane ·and Braffet defendants.·
'·

.

, ... -. Furthermore, the reaso~ing of the defendants which
has been sustained by the Lower Court, in effect says that
th~ .provisions of Rule 41- (a) (1) are exclusive, that any
dismissal made· either by plaintiff or on motion by plaintiff
~o.llowed by an·· order of court, and made before answer
or motion. for summary judgement is filed, comes under the
purview . of said subdivision. Under this reasoning the
col.lrt. has no jurisdiction to make an order dismissing an
~~tion.. :\ritp.out prejudice until after an answer has been
.

.

filed~or.a-motion

for summary judgement is made. Further,
·under this reasoning, the defendants virtually claim that all
··:~ ·~ :::·~.;··
~~·
of the Orders made by Judge R. L. Tuckett, are set aside
by the Decree in this present case, and that said actions
were riot. dismissed without prejudice but are now dismissed
With prejudice.
f

..

I

.. ,

•

•

,.

':

:

•

•

••

The J?laintiffs cannot go along with this reasoning.
Rule ~1 (a) (~) states that the plaintiff "MAY" file a notice
of dismissal of an action. He is not required to do so.
There is nothing in the whole rule which deprives the
judge of jurisdiction to make an order dismisSing an
action before an answer is filed or a motion for summary
judgement made. Plaintiffs claim that all of the orders
'

:1

I

,I

34
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

made by by Judge R. L. Tuckett are res adjudicata, and
except for the interpleadings, are final orders which cannot
be set aside by Judge Joseph E. Nelson in the Decree
Quieting Title in this present action. The plaintiffs cannot
be bound by Notices of Dismissal when they have filed none.
In arguing this matter before the lower court and in
briefs, plaintiffs urged that they could find no case anywhere that applied the two dismissal rule set up in subdivision (1) of said Rule to an action which had been
dismissed by order of the court. In answer to this

~ugges

tion, defendants quoted from several cases, some of which
are as follows:
Robertshaw-Fulton Controls Company vs. Noma Electric Corporation, 10 Federal Rules Decisions at page 32,
which in part said:
"Plaintiff filed notice of dismissal of the present
suit."
Cleveland Trust Company vs. Osher and Reiss, 31
Federal Supplement, page 985:
"The purpose of the rule providing that dismissal
is without prejudice, except that a notice of
dismissal operates as an adjuica tion on the merits
when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed,
is to prevent the delays and litigation by numerous
dismissals without prejudice."
Hineline vs. Minneapolis Honeywell Company, 78 Federal 2d, 854:
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· · ·.~'The· cas·e was set for- trial and 1ater ·the plaintiff
:.w~missed the case."

·,!·Even. after inviting the defendants to quote one case in
,·,(.·<; ,.

• ·,

'.

;• .. ',

'

•

r·

•,

.

,,

o

....

,•

·which the double-dismissal rule \vas held · to be effective
after ~:idfsmissal
order of the ~ourt plaintiffs f._~':~~ yc:t

l)'y

1<?

~e,ad.aJl:Y. ca~e

.tpe.

~!-~r

_providing for the application of the rule
action has bee~ dismi~sed. witnout .prejudice,_ ·by

P.~~er . :of. the

court..

:;.: .·.AF'page 84''of.the'record,·the Zane·defehdants m'their
Second Defense~ allege~the filing of Civil Action :No. 2263
·ns·· ·being the~ first action which .was disrirlssed. ··This action
was dismissed by Order of Judge R. L. Tuckett, insofar
as! ;th~~ -Z~ne
•.

' .

• ~

.-

'

I

.-./".

.

~•

_def~ndants
~.

.

.

• •

are.. .concerned, on _November 3rd,
•

•

.

•

-

1.~~~~.·

(See ._file) .. Tha~ was._ long before our present rules
were adopted. The Note at the end of. Rule 41 (a) (1)

states that the double dismissal feature was new matter.
:Tliet~ior~~:~ civif . 'Action 'No.. 2263 cannot be. _i.tsed here.
When the Civil file No. 2263 was presented in evidence,
{Transcript 10) ·objection was made to its admission by the
plaintiffs on the following grounds:
I

~I

I

'

' I

'

~

'

'•

.•

\•

. "on . the · grounds that the file is incompetent
that the issues therein stated and
immaterial,
stated in· the answer of Dallas H. Young, Jr.
as· administrator of the estate with the will
annexed· of the estate of John Macy Zane, deceased, is. ~es Judicata and the action was dismissed by order of the Court and the order was
. not. appealed from." ( Transcript 10).

and

When the file in Civil Action No. 2693 was offered
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in evidence by defendants (Transcript 10-11), objection
was made by the plaintiffs as follows:
"We object to the introduction of an exhibit on
the grounds that it is not within the issues of the
case. There is no pleading to warrant the introduction of this file in evidence and we object
further on the grounds that this is an attempt
to set aside a valid order of this Court, the order
being one dismissing the action without prejudice
which was duly signed by Judge Tuckett and
therefore the introduction of this is not within
the issues of the case."
Plaintiffs urge that both of the above objections were
well taken. The orders of dismissal in both actions speak
for themselves and make the issue res adjudicata. There
are no pleadings in the Amended Answer of the Zane
interests (Record 92-86) to warrant the introduction of the
file in Civil Action No. 2693.
The file in Civil Action No. 2263 discloses that it is
not the same cause of action as set forth in civil actions
Nos. 2693 and 2764. As set forth at ·page 5 of this brief,
there were numerous parties who were either plaintiffs or
were joined with them, who were not parties in No. 2263
who were made parties in Nos. 2693 and 2764. Likewise,
numerous defendants were brought into Nos. 2693 and
2764 who were not parties in 2263. Therefore, the dismissal
of No. 2263 could in no wise be construed as a dismissal of
the same causes of action set forth in Nos. 2693 and 2764.
Plaintiffs who were not parties therein could not dismiss
No. 2263. Civil Action No. 2764 is the present action. It
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cannot be used in connection with either 2263 or 2693 to
show double-dismissal, inasmuch as·· the Zane·. defendants
.:rely :on. the ·:continuation of Action Np. 2764 in order to
obtain :any ·judgement~
. .r.; .. :

The·defense of .the double dismissal made by the Zane

·d~fendants
is therefore untenable. The de·cree of the lower
... ·.·:·:· .
·'

court should.be
. . reversed as to them.
.

-

: :: .

~~

.

.

.

~

~

'

::~'.,.. . , .. ._find1ngs
Qf.
:Fact IX, X and XI, and the Orders of Dis. ...
·: ...

...

:

:

';.

missal in civil actions Nos. 2263,2693 and 2764-show that
all
dismissals
. ...·... .
. . were made by order of court under Rule
~-.

·.

;

41:- (a) (2). Plaintiffs believe that the rule means what it
/ ••• :·.

'J'

~~ys

and t~at· any dismissal made by order of the court
·is;,W,itho~t' 'predjudice unless otherwise stated in th~ order.

.,Pi~ktlffs fhrther

::~lai~tiffi.:flle ~0

belie~e

that the rule requires that a
notices of dismissal without order· of the

court to be bound by the two dismissal rule. The plaintiffs
.•

.. .

. ••.'t"','i:

..

.

.

have yet to file their first notice of dismissal without order

-~lth~· cou~t.
Plaintiffs have searched diligently to find a case which
turns·on the point of that.a plaintiff is bound under the two
dismissal rule when the former actions were dismissed by
,~order .of the· court. We have found none, and therefore no
authorities are quoted.
POINT IV.
CONCLUSION OF LAW NO. 4 IS CONTRARY TO
AND NOT- SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT,
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THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ON FILE, AND THE
LAW, AND THE RECORD SHOWS THAT THE DEFENDANTS NAMED THEREIN DID NOT AT ANY TIME
HAVE THE INTEREST AWARDED TO THEM IN SAID
CONCLUSION.
If this Supreme Court holds that all of the defendants

are barred by limitations, that the statute was neither
tolled as to any of them, nor avoided by the two dismissal
rule set up by defendants, then it will be unnecessary to
consider Points IV and V in this brief.

If, however, the

ruling should be against the plaintiffs on these matters of
limitation, it will be necessary to determine the interests
actually held by the defendants.
Conclusion of Law No. 4, (Record 181-2) awards to
the Smith defendants "an undivided 11.1 interest in the
land described in the complaint as against the plaintiffs,
all and severally, and all persons claiming under them,
subject to the interest in said land reserved by Maude
White Waring." There is no conclusion as to the interest
reserved by Maude White Waring. In the Amended Decree,
(Record 184) it is decreed that the Smith defendants "are
the owners in fee simple of an undivided 1/3 interest in the
land hereinafter described, as against the plaintiffs, all
and severally, and all persons claiming under them."
In their answer (Record 14-16), the Smith defendants

do not make any affirmative allegations as to what interest
they own in the lands involved in the action. Their entire
39
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answer' ·consists' jri' general ~admissions.' and ' denials 'of the
"complaint.~--: ·No ·counter.;claim isi:. ·a.neged: ··In· their pi·ayer
·m- ·:said< answe·r, these defendants... pray that· defendants'
'~.~title atid 'Ownership in . ari 'undivided:orte-third (1/a) interest
in the real property described in the complaint be quieted
in t~ese defenQants" witho~~ ~ny pleadings upon which to

,~~~~:,t~i; :rf~~~r.' ·~·· ,r.;, :,r,~;

.

.,

<

~

', •. ,

·.:',;

••.

:...

.: :):·::::: JJnder . . Rule 8 .(a), Utah ·Rules· of :Civil:Procedure, the
._Smit:\1:.:defendants are entitled to· no· affirmative relief ·as
,_prayeJ.for: ln tbeir~·-Answer. '. -They have· alieged no facts
··shqwi:ng -.that.,they= are· ,~entitled to· the affirmative relief

'·Pf~Y~rLfor•.
Finding of Fact IV shows: that the' ··slnith '-'defendants
lWd .1P~. ~r&ffet: de~~J?.<l~n,ts cl_ai:r:n the same 4:lterest, namely
th~ undi yiqe<I.. lj3 inte.rest w~ich was not conyeyed. ~way by
Mar~-~~~~~ffet . ,d~~ng.
hi~> life.time._ This finding,
further
.
.·
.
.

; .' :

~

.: • :. J ..

.t .: ;; .:

. ·:

•

~~-

.

~:

!·,

•. : -~-

. . .. . . .. .

.: .

;~

'

• :·

; ,!

.:

.

:·

.

... .

.

:

'•

.

,.

••

. .

. ..

•

.

.

. :

.

:

.

••

.

•.

•. :

-

.

. .

:. .

. :: . •

.

.

s~~s. fo~~ JP.~~.:Mc;trk.P~ _]~Jr~ftet .conv~yed. ~~divided %
inter.est during his lifetime, and_ that his wife, Hannah J.
•·

·· . :

'I

':'.

•

•

·::.::

',,

,:':••

'•••1'

'••

.

.. ':.

)·,

•

..

,:

•

..

.

'

'

Braffet,
·who
survived
him,
did not join in the conveyances.
..
··.··..
.. .
. ..
.
.
...
(Record 173-174) . ~he question .. is then pos.~d: Did the
--~~~~i~in~:.,lj3 interest descend t~ Han~ah J. Braffet as her
.

··'"·:

·1·'· .r;.

~\:: =-~~

·

•'

.• •• · •

:: ·

.

-

.

·

statutory.
ope-thi~d interest, or did the interest descend
:;:!'
.
. ·' .:
to the heirs of Mark P. Braffet, deceased, and the subse.q~e~t' .Decree of Dlstrib~tion set .forth in .Finding IV .(g)
(Record 154)---~est the···:tltl~ in .. Maude White? In other
!,

:·

,·.

w·ords, did Maude· White su-cceed to her title as an heir of
·Mark P. Braffet, or as an ·heir of Hannah J. Braffet? The
·crux of the argument under this point is as to what interest
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was conveyed by Maude White, also known as Maude V.
White, also known as Maude Braffet White, to David G.
Smith, by the deed set forth in said Finding IV in paragraph
(i) (Record 154, Plaintiffs' Exhibit C, page 205.)
It is to be noted here that all deeds, instruments and
proceedings must be taken at their face value as there is
no testimony to alter or vary the instruments and proceedings.
At pages 77 to 81 of the record appears the Answer
of Intervenor, wherein Karl V. King, administrator of the
Estate of Hannah J. Braffet, Deceased sets forth that at the
time of her death "the said Hannah J. Braffet," "had an
undivided interest in the real estate described in the complaint and that upon her death her interest descended to
her heirs subject to being probated." The prayer prayed
that "defendant's title and ownership in an undivided interest in the real property described in the complaint, as her
interest may appear, be quieted in the intervenor and this
defendant.'' The same attorneys represented the Smith
defendants as represented the Braffet defendants. The
interest claimed by the Braffet defendants were adverse to
the interests claimed by the Smith defendants. If Hannah
J. Braffet had any interest in the property, she took it
under her statutory one-third allowed by law out of her
husband's estate, and she had the whole interest. If she
had this one-third interest, her property succeeded to her
three children who are named in Finding of Fact IV, paragraph (h).
What about the one-third undivided interest?
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· Hilton ·v. Thatcher, ·;31 Utah, 360, 88 Pac. 20 settles the
law> as: to :the statutes governing in· the instant case. It
reads .in :part as follows, at page 22 in the second column:
.. ·

.

'

"It is further conceded that the right of dower is
:·. · ·· gove~ned by>the.law· in force at·the death of the
husband· \vhile the measure of the right is deter_,,(·l·(i;,,';.:::;·:.·.;' 'mined by·th~·'law 'in.''force. af the time of the }l~sband's conveyance where the wife did not relin··;:5;,:,.:,."~'.:'~: /~ :'' quisb:· ·her right. · This, beyond ·pera~venture, is
. ,· ... the $e,ttl.ed la.w, and w~ s9 hoi~."
··I··

, 1 .__ :

-~'":

·

"'

.•

'

•

·In··~othe:r·:words,

.

•

.

•

•

the>law that· was. applicable to the

86wer.-:or ·statUtory interest of the widow· on January 2nd,
1927, the date ofth·e death of Mark P. Braffet, governs this
interest. Sectiorf 6406:···compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, Volume· 2; page ·1232, was -the governing statute. It reads as

follows:·. :::.:· .:.· .
. ·: · -~ ·~ .:~ 6406. (2826).

Wife's interest in her husband's
· ; . . ;:·..,.~. rea1 property. 'One-third in value of all the legal
:: ..·::::~~:;_ ~,;:for: equitable: estates·· in real property possessed ·by
.· ,.
. :.. the husband. at ~ny time during the marriage,_
and to which the Wife has made no relinquishment
•·of her rights, shall be set apart. as her property in
·.fee simple if she survive him; provided, that the
wife. shall not be entitled to any .interest under
the provisions of this section in any such estate of
· which the husband has made a conveyance when
·the wife, at the time of the conveyance, is not
.. qr never has been a resident of the territory or
·state of Utah. Property distributed under the
provisions, of this section ·shall be free from all
debts of the decedent, except those secured by
mechanics' or laborers' liens for work or labor
'done or rna terial furnished exclusively fd'r the
.·,,

.

I

I

.

.. ·:·····

:.··:

·,;

.. ' ... ·

..

, I

.

.

.. ·

;:

.
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improvement of the same, and except those created for the purchase thereof, and for taxes levied
thereon. The value of such part of the homestead as may be set aside to the widow shall be
deducted from the distributive share provided for
her in this section. In cases wherein only the
heirs, devisees, and legatees of the decedent are
interested, the property secured to the widow by
this section may be set off by the court in due
process of administration.
The above statute was formely Section 2826, Compiled
Laws of Utah, 1907. Prior to that it was Section 2826,
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1898. In the Revised Statutes of
Utah, 1933, it is unchanged as Section 101-4-3. In the Utah
Code Annotated, 1943, it is unchanged as Section 101-4-3.
In the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the section is 74-4-3,
Volume 8, page 49.
The original basic case involving the issue before the
court, namely, the wife's share in the lands of her deceased
husband conveyed by him during the marriage without her
consent, is best presented by the case of In re Park's Estate,
Hilton v. Stewart, 31 Utah, 255, 87 P. 900, 8 L. R. A. (N.S.)
1101. In that case the wife was attempting to get a money
judgment against the estate of her deceased husband for a
one-third of the value of lands conveyed by the husband
during his lifetime without her consent. The court says,
at pages 902 and 903:
Does section 2826 give such a right? We think
not. Counsel for appellant lays much stress upon
the wording of that section in that it says "one43
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third· in value" shall be the wife's interest. This
·of itself added nothing ·at all to her interest. At
·:common law· all courts in distributing the wife's
share always sought to fix it as nearly as possible
fn each ·case at one-third the value, even where
the same was set off to her in kind. To have
··.. :.;
done· otherwise \Vould' have been a farce not to be
· tolerated by any court. But the statute does not
. ··say that.this one~ third irt value shall be set apart
to her out of the estate of the husband, but the
statute says "one-third in value of all the legal or
equitable ·estates· in ·real property possessed by the
husband at any· time during the marriage * * *
shall be set. apart as. her property in fee simple
ff she survives him." This refers to the land itself that was ·possessed by him during the mar.·/. ·: riage): not . .to any kind of property that may be
l~ft .~y him at .his death constituting his estate.
Moreover· ·appellant's counsel concedes that the
law in force at the time of the husband's conveyance controls as to the measure of the wife's
'j r: : ·. ·.... -. ···.:interest~
If this be· so, in case the law is changed
;;::; ·.·._!:; ...; ·:-·..
.after conveyance; .·and before the death of the
, ... '" husbC1nd, so as to ~nlarge the wife's interest, how
cari the wife claim the enlarged right against the
L :I
husband's ·estate any more than she could against
his grantee?
·j.

~~

Under the law as it was at the time of the conveyance the husband had a legal as well as a
.moral right to transfer. his entire interest. This
interest consisted of the fee to the land, except
that it was ·encumbered by the inchoate interest
of the wife. In case she survived him she thus
had and could have no greater interest in the
la'nds conveyed by him than the law gave her.
·'The ·Legislature, by adopting section 2826, could
· not nor did it attempt to enlarge the widow's in-
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terest in then alienated lands. What could not
be done directly we do not think can be or was
contemplated to be done indirectly. But if appellant's contention is sound, the Legislature accomplished by indirection what she concedes they
could not do directly. We cannot yield our assent
to this contention, but feel constrained to hold
that the wife, if she desires to recover her interest in her husband's lands alienated by him during
marriage, without her consent, must resort to the
lands themselves, and that she can recover such
interest only as the law gave her at the time the
lands were aliena ted by the husband. In all lands
possessed by him at the time of his death, and in
all that were alienated by him under the law as it
stood at the time of his death, she takes her
interest in accordance with that law. It must not
be overlooked that the inchoate contingent interest of the wife in her husband's lands is in the
nature of an incumbrance which may or may not
become an absolute and enforceable right dependent upon the one fact that she survives her
husband. This incumbrance is against the land,
and exists against each specific parcel while the
right remains inchoate. Neither is the right
changed when it becomes vested and enforceable
upon the death of the husband, so that it may be
shifted at the pleasure of the wife from one parcel
to another, or against one grantee, and not against
another. THE INTEREST OF THE WIFE IS IN
THE LAND ITSELF TO BE APPORTIONED TO
HER ONE-THIRD IN VALUE OUT OF EACH
PARCEL. (Emphasis ours.)
The right to an interest exists, if it exists at all,
by virtue of the law, and not by virtue of contract,
and hence must be enforced according to the law
that gives the right to such interest.
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·From this case, it is noted that where the deceased has
conveyed 'the property without his wife's consent, that the
one-third interest of the wife in that property vests immediately upon·the death of her husband in the surviving widow,
that she must reso~ to the property itself, and in this case,
where only two-thirds undivided interest in the land was
alienated·by· the husband, the remaining one-third vests in
fee. sirnple. in the widow without further proceedings in the
estate. This interest belongs to her by operation of law
and· vests a fee simple title in the widow. The estate of the
hU:s~and. arid

the heirs of the deceased have absolutely no
interest therein.
The next case is the one which is used in Utah as the
basic case on the subject. It is the case of In Re Bullen's

ESta.t~, 47 ·.utah 96, 151 Pac. 533, L.R.A. 1916c, 670.

The

rule is still in effect in Utah and is as follows:
··That the wife receives under section 2826---one~ third in fee simple of all the legal and equitable
·estate on real property possessed by the husband
during coverture, and not relinquished by hershe receives, not as an heir of her husband, but
in her own right, something which belongs to her
absolutely, and of which she could not have been
deprived by will or by any other voluntary act of
her husband without her consent. Under that
section, she is not an heir within the meaning of
our intestate or succession statutes.

*****
So here, while under our statute the wife does not
take as a survivor of community property, she
nevertheless takes her one-third interest in the
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husband's real estate in fee simple, just as absolute
and as much in her own right as does the wife
take her one-half in community property. In
neither instance can she be deprived of that right
by will, or by any other voluntary act of her
husband without her consent, and neither is her
interest awarded or acquired by succession, descent, or inheritance. Succession, as defined by
the statute, "is the coming in of another to take
the property of one who dies without disposing
of it by will." That implies that property acquired by sucession may be disposed of by will. But
the property which the wife takes under section
2826 may not be disposed of by will without her
consent.
Now, under parts of section 2828 the widow is an
heir of her husband; when he dies intestate leaving a wife and one child, the estate going one-half
to her and one-half to the child, and if no issue,
the whole of the estate, if not over $5,000 in value,
to her. Thus what goes to her under section 2828,
over and above her one-third interest granted
under section 2826, she takes as an heir of her
husband, for that he may dispose of by will to her
or to another. That she takes under the intestate
laws or statutes of inheritance. But that which
she takes under section 2826 she takes absolutely
and in her own right, and not by succession or
inheritance. We think that the fair meaning of
the statute of succession.
The case of Jeppson v. Jeppson, 115 Utah, 541; 206
P.2d 711, states:
The surviving widow's statutory have been fully
discussed by this court in several cases, and need
not be further set out here. See In re Bullen's
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Estate, 47 Utah 96, 151 P. 533, L.R.A. 1916C, 670;
In re Kohn's Estate, 56 Utah 17, 189 P. 409; and
Staats v. Staats, 63 Utah 470, 226 P. 677.
The law quoted in these three cases above is still in
force in Utah.
Great stress was

l~id

by the Smith defendants, adverse-

ly ·to· the Braffet defendants, upon the "Waiver of Notice
and Consent to Partial Distribution" signed by Hannah
B.raffet, and appearing at page 131 of the .kbstract of title,
~laintiffs'

Exhibit C.. The petition for partial distribution

is set forth at pages 103 to 111 of the said abstract.
page 106, the petition reads:

At

That your petitioner, believing it to be for the best
interests OF SAID HEmS and that no one
INTERESTED IN SAID ESTATE will be prejudiced by the partial distribution of the property
of said estate at this time and, each of said HEms
having consented thereto, as will appear from
.their written waiver of notice and consent to par. tial distribution to be hereafter filed herein, your
petitioner recommends and prays that the following property, now on hand as shown by the
inventary of said estate and the account filed
herewith, be distributed in the manner and to
the persons entitled as follows, to-wit: (Emphasis
ours.)
The said waiver at page 131 of the abstract reads:
The undersigned, BEING AN HEm OF MARK
P. BRAFFET, DECEASED, hereby waives notice
of the time and place of hearing of the Administrator's First Account and Report and Petition for

48
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Partial Distribution, copies of which are hereto
annexed, and consents to the hearing of said
First Account and Report and Petition for Partial
Distribution at any time; and the UNDERSIGNED
HEIR, believing it to be for the best interests of
all OF THE HEIRS of said deceased and that no
one INTERESTED IN SAID ESTATE will be prejudiced thereby, hereby consents and agrees to
the manner and mode of partial distribution as
set forth and as provided for in said annexed
Petition for Partial Distribution, and further consents and agrees that the property BELONGING
TO SAID ESTATE, not so distributed, shall remain in the estate subject to administration and
future distribution. And the undersigned further
certifies that he has read the annexed First
Account and Report and Petition for Partial Distribution.
Dated this 5th day of August, 1927.
Hannah Braffet
(Emphasis ours.)
There is nothing in this waiver and consent which
refers to any separate property of Hannah Braffet. The
only property affected is that BELONGING TO THE ESTATE and to which Hannah Braffet succeeded as an HEIR.
There is nothing in the waiver and consent that suggests
that the property distributed by the court to said Hannah
Braffet was in lieu of her statutory interest or that it was
made as a set-off to such interest.
The Decree of P«!rtial Distribution is shown at pages
148 to 152 of the abstract. (Plaintiff's Exhibit C). At page
149 the following statement is made:
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUD·GED AND
'DECREED that partial distribution OF SAID
ESTATE be made as follows: to-wit: (Emphasis
ours.)
The case of Staats v. Staats, 63 Utah 470, 226 Pac. 677
~tates

at page 680, second column:
T.his court is, ho:wever, committed to a contrary
. _doctrine, in that _we have held that under our
~tatute the widow of a deceased husband does not
take as an heir.. In re Bullen's Estate, 47 Utah,
90, 151 Pac. 533, L. R. A. 1916C, 670. It is held
that a widow ta~es_ her one-third interest in her
husband's real estate not as an heir, but in her
own right..

This being so, the interest that Hannah Braffet relinquished as an heir In the probate proceedings in her husband's estate, had absolutely no effect upon her one-third
interest which she owned in fee simple by operation of law
upon her husband's death. · Because of this, Maude White
received no title by virtue of the Decree of Distribution in
the Matter of the Estate of Mark P. Braffet, Deceased. The
estate had no title to distribute. Hannah Braffet, the
widow, has never relinquished her one-third interest in the
lands involved in this action which belonged to her in fee
simple upon the death of her husband.
Hannah Braffet (or Hannah J. Braffet), the widow of
Mark P. Braffet, died on or about December 7th, 1938, at
Price, Utah (Plaintiff's Exhibit C, page 181.) Her estate
is being probated as No. 1206 in Carbon County, Utah. No
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distribution in the estate has yet been made, although the
original administrator was appointed on August 19th, 1940
(Plaintiff's Exhibit C page 187), but said administrator
never qualified. Karl V. King is now the duly appointed,
qualified and acting administrator of her estate, and was
represented herein by the same attorneys who represent
the Smith interests.
Said Hannah J. Braffet left three heirs, namely, Robert
I. Braffet, Maude White and James H. Braffet. (Finding
of Fact IV (h) ). Under Section 74-4-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, these heirs succeeded to the title of the onethird interest vested in the deceased at the time of her
death. Maude White would have a vested interest of an
undivided one-ninth in the lands involved in this action, she
receiving one-third of the one-third fee simple title owned
by the deceased. In the actions herein involved, Maude
White (now Maude White Waring) has made no appearances. Karl V. King as the administrator of the Estate of
Hannah J. Braffet, Deceased, represents her in this action.
(Section 75-11-5 U.C.A. 1953).
The above one-ninth interest is all that Maude White
has ever been vested with in fee simple, as she took no title
under the Estate of Mark P. Braffet, Deceased. Whatever
interest the Smith interests have in this action came
through this one-ninth interest vested in Maude White upon
the death of her mother, Hannah J. Braffet.
At page 205 of the abstract of title is shown a Quit-
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Claim Deed from Maude White, also known as Maude V.
White, also known as Maude Braffet White, being one and
the same person in her own right, grantor, to David G.
Smith, grantee, which deed is dated December 4th, 1945,
and recorded December 19th, 1945, in Book "19" of Deeds,
at page 492, as Entry No. 76857 of the records of Duchesne
County, Utah. It is under this deed that the Smith interests claim all of the title which they have in the property
involved in this action, and the other prior actions. What
did this deed convey to David G .Smith?
As above set forth, Maude White was vested upon the
death of her mother, Hannah J. Braffet, with an undivided
one-ninth interest in the property involved in this action.
She could not convey more than she had. The deed conveys:
All of Section 11, except the Northeast Quarter
(NE14 of the Northeast Quarter (NE%), of
Township 4 South, Range 5 West, Uintah Special
Meridian.
Saving and excepting and reserving to the Grantor, her heirs, and assigns, out of the grant hereby
made, a one-sixth (1/6) interest in all oil, gas and
minerals under said premises hereby conveyed,
and the right to go upon the said land and drill
and prospect and remove, by pipe-line or otherwise, any oil, gas or minerals belonging to the
Grantor, her administrators, assigns, or executor~:
In the light of the discussions had above, this conveyance would convey an undivided one-ninth interest in the
52
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

surface rights of the above property, and would reserve
one-sixth of the oil, gas and minerals in all of the property
to the grantor. The grantor did not have one-sixth to reserve so that she would reserve all that she did have, oneninth of such oil, gas and minerals. This one-ninth of the
minerals would remain in the possession and control of the
administrator of the Estate of Hannah J. Braffet, Deceased,
until distribution is made. The appearance of Karl V. King,
as administrator of the Estate of Hannah J. Braffet, Deceased, would place the interests in the minerals retained
by Maude White in litigation here, with Karl V. King as
such administrator representing the Maude White interests.
The appearance of the Smith interests personally would
litigate only the one-ninth of the surface conveyed by the
above Quit-Claim Deed. All of the defendants' claims are
made by the same attorneys.
It is interesting to note the Decree entered by this
Court on September lOth, 1954 as to the interests quieted in
the various parties. (Record 104-106). In paragraphs 1 and
3 of the Decree the following appears:
1. That subject to the interest of Maude White
Warring, the defendants L .L. Pack, Helen B.
Mott and W. H. Coltharp and The Continental
Bank and Trust Company, administrator of the
estate of David G. Smith, deceased, are the owners in fee simple of an undivided lj3 interest in
the land hereinafter described, as against the
plaintiffs all and severally and all persons claiming under them.

* ****
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· 3. Karl V. King, administrator of the estate of
Hannah J. Braffet, deceased, is the owner in fee
simple of an undivided 2/9 interest in the land
hereinafter described as against the plaintiffs all
and severally and all persons claiming under them.
5/9 of the title is quieted in successors in title to Mark
P. Braffet when he only owned an undivided lj3 interest in
the property at the time of his death. The same attorneys
represent a~l answe~ing interests. They have prepared a
Decree which in effect says that Hannah J. Braffet at the
time of her death was vested with a fee simple to an undivided one-third of the property involved in this action.
They then say in the Decree which they prepared that when
Maude Wpite, one of the heirs of Hannah J. Braffet, conveyed her interest as an heir of Hannah J. Braffet, deceased,
she conveyed a one-third interest in the proprty when she
could not have inherited more than one-ninth thereof.
In construing the deed from Maude White to David G.

Smith set forth above, there is no evidence in the record to
show an intent of the parties in the execution of this deed.
The deed must be taken at its face value.
The deed conveys all of the land and reserves "one-sixth
(1/6) interest in ALL oil, gas and mineral under said premises hereby conveyed" (Emphasis ours.) The grantor, no
doubt, thought that she had a one-third interest in the
land and was reserving one-half of the oil, gas and minerals
which she supposedly owned. Whatever she thought does
not change or alter the interest which she actually had in
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the property. What she actually owned and reserved is
still her property. She therefore, as an heir of Hannah J.
Braffet, deceased, is vested with an undivided one-ninth of
the oil, gas and minerals in the lands involved in this action,
subject to probating, and subject to the rights of the plaintiffs herein.
At pages 254 and 255 of the abstract of title (Plaintiffs'
Exhibit C) is shown a Quit-Claim Deed from David G. Smith
and Juanita C. Smith, his wife, to Helen B. Mott, dated
February 1st, 1950, and recorded April 25th, 1950, in Book
"24" of Deeds, pages 83-84, as Entry No. 87490 of the records of Duchesne County, Utah. This deed purports to convey an undivided one-fourth interest in the entire property
involved in this action. Inasmuch as David G. Smith was
vested with an undivided one-ninth of the surface at the
time of the execution of this deed, all of his interest passed
to said Helen B. Mott. He, and The Continental Bank and
Trust Company, administrator of the Estate of David G.
Smith, Deceased, and Juanita C. Smith, widow of deceased
David G. Smith, had no interest in the property at the time
of the commencement of this action.
At page 256 of the abstract of title (Plaintiffs' Exhibit
C) is shown a Quit-Claim Deed from David G. Smith and
Juanita C. Smith, his wife, to W. H. Coltharp, dated February 1st, 1950 and recorded May 3rd, 1950, in Book "9" of
Mining Records, page 132, as Entry No. 87621 of the records
of Duchesne County, Utah. While this deed was executed
the same day as the deed to Helen B. Mott above, there is
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no evidence in the record that Helen B. Mott had any actual
notice of the execution of this second deed which was not
recorded for some time after the deed to Helen B. Mott
was recorded. Helen B. Mott, having succeeded to all of
the title of David G. Smith, William H. Coltharp took no
interest by his deed, and the defendants, W. H. Coltharp and
Oral Coltharp had no right, title or interest in the lands
involved in this action at the time of the commencement of
the action.
At page 257 of the abstract of title (Plaintiffs' Exhibit
C) is shown a Quit-Claim Deed from David G. Smith and
Juanita C. Smith, his wife, to L. L. Pack, dated February
1st, 1950, and recorded May lOth, 1950, in Book "9" of Mining Records, page 175, as Entry No. 87685 of said County
Records. The same facts govern as are set forth above. L.
L. Pack and Nora E. Pack, his wife, had no right, title or
interest in the lands involved in this action at the time of
the commencement of this action.
Therefore, even though this Supreme Court should
hold that the Smith defendants are entitled to recover, the
only interest that it would affect would be an undivided
one-ninth interest in the surface rights. That is all of the
title they can show by the findings of fact and documentary
evidence introduced in evidence. This interest is subject to
probating in the Estate of Hannah J. Braffet, deceased.
POINT V.
CONCLUSION OF LAW NO. 6 IS CONTRARY TO
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AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT,
THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ON FILE, AND THE
LAW.
The argument for this point is the same as that for
Point N, as far as it goes. The same attorneys represented
all defendants, even though the interests of the Smith defendants and Braffet defendants were adverse. As set forth
under Point IV, anything the Smith defendants get is by
succession through Hannah J. Braffet, deceased.

Section

74-4-2 U.C.A. 1953, provides:
"74-4-2.
PROPERTY OF INTESTATE
PASSES SUBJECT TO PROBATE PROCEEDINGS.-The property, both real and personal, of
• without disposing of it by will passone who d!les
es to the heirs of the intestate, subject to the control of the court, and to the possession of any
administrator appointed by the court for the
purposes of administration.''
Section 75-11-4, U.C.A. 1953, provides:
"75-11-4. POSSESSION OF REPRESENTVATIVE POSSESSION OF HEIRS AND DEVISEES.-For the purpose of bringing suits to
quiet title, or for partition of the estate, the possession of the executors or administrators is the
possession of the heirs or devisees; such possession
by the heirs or devisees is subject, however, to
the possession of the executor or administrator
for the purposes of administration as provided in
this title."
When the attorney for all defendants filed the Answer
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of Intervenor (Record 77-81) of Karl V. King, administrator
of the Estate of Hannah J. Braffet, Deceased, the entire
interest owned by Hannah J. Braffet at the time of her
death was being litigated by said administrator.

This ac-

tion is a possessory action. Finding of Fact No. II (Record
173) finds that Karl V. King is the duly appointed, qualified
and acting administrator of the Estate of Hannah J. Braffet,
deceased.

Karl V. King, as such administrator, has the

right of possession to any interest in and to the property
involved in this action, owned by Hannah J. Braffet at the
time of her death. The Smith defendants claim under
Maude V. White (Waring), and her only interest was as an
heir of Hannah J. Braffet deceased. Therefore, Karl V.
King, as such administrator, has the right of possession to
any interest ~he _Smith defendants may claim in this action.
In withdrawing ·as counsel-for Karl V. King, administrator,
(Record 114)" the same counsel for the Smith defendants
cannot now say that he has not withdrawn as counsel for
same interests which are now claimed by the Smith defendants adversely to the said administrator. Karl V. King, administrator, is in default.

The record shows that subject

to the tax sale and before her death, Hannah J. Braffet was
vested with the one-third interest she took upon the death
of her husband.

Because of the default of such adminis-

trator, plaintiffs are entitled to a decree quieting their title
to an undivided one-third interest in the property involved
in this action, said interest to include any rights claimed
by the Smith and Braffet defendants. This would apply
even though the Smith defendants are not barred by limi58
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tations, which plaintiffs do not admit.
Conclusion of Law No. 6 should be set aside and a new
conclusion made setting forth that the plaintiffs are entitled
to a decree quieting their title as to this one-third interest.
POINT VI.
THE AMENDED DE·CREE IS CONTRARY TO AND
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT, THE
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ON FILE, AND THE LAW.
Plaintiffs most strongly urge that the argument presented heretofore in this brief has shown that all of the conclusions of law (Record 181-183) are not suported by the
findings of fact and the documentary evidence on file, and
that all of them are in error in applying the law to the facts
found.

Plaintiffs urge that they are entitled to have this

Supreme Court withdraw all of the conclusions of law on
the grounds herein set forth, and order new conclusions
made to conform to the arguments hereinbefore presented.
Under these circumstances, the Amended Decree should be
reversed and judgment given to plaintiffs.
POINT VII.
FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT, THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ON FILE, AND THE LAW, THE
PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO
A DECREE QUIETING THEIR TITLE AS AGAINST ALL
OF THE ANSWERING DEFENDANTS AND ALL OF
THE RESPONDENTS.
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Plaintiffs claim that the amended findings of fact
(Record 171-180). ~how that the plaintiffs are entitled to a
gecree quieting their title as against all of the respondents.
Pla~nt~ffs filed proposed findings of fact (Record 151-160)
which are nearly identical with the Amended Findings of
Fact (Record 171-180). Plaintiffs most strongly urge that
applying the Jaw hereinbefore set forth to these findings of
fact, that the plaintiffs are entitled to a Decree quieting
their title.
The basis of the plaint~ffs title is set forth in finding
of fact No. 5 (Record 176)._ The validity and regularity of
the instruments set forth in said finding is nowhere ques·
tioned. Pla\ntiffs' Exhibit ~ is a certified copy of the
Auditor's Tax D~ed and is regular on its face in every respect. Under the ruling of this Supreme Court in Hansen
v. Morris, supra, plaintiffs are entitled to a decree quieting their title in the premises against all of the respondents.
CONCLUSION.

The plaintiffs and appellants have proved their case.
They are entitled to a Decree quieting their title on the
record on appeal.
Karl V. King, administrator of the Estate of Hannah J.
Braffet, Deceased, the claimant of an undivided one-third
interest in the property, is in default. He represents any
interest claimed by the so-called Smith defendants.
The so-called Smith defendants cannot recover for the
following reasons:
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(1) They are barred by the provisions of Chapter 19,
Laws of Utah, 1951.
(2) They did not plead in their answer any affirmative allegations which would avoid the bar of the statute of
limitations.
(3) Civil Action No. 2693 tolled the statute of limitations only for the purpose of that particular action, and did
not toll said statute as to the present action.
(4) The answer filed by said defendants did not make
any allegations for any affirmative relief.
The so-called Zane defendants are barred by the provisions of Chapter 19, Laws of Utah, 1951. The orders dismissing the various actions, all signed by Judge R. L.
Tuckett, did not constitute an adjudication on the merits.

Plaintiffs
and Appellants.
Address: Heber, Utah.
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